Civilisation, Colonialism, and Restitution: Reassessing the Historical Foundations of International Cultural Heritage Law

Abstract

The contemporary debate on the restitution of cultural objects is deeply rooted in the historical development of international cultural heritage law during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This article offers a critical re-narration of that history, challenging conventional accounts that portray the evolution of cultural heritage protection as a neutral or universally progressive legal enterprise. Instead, it situates the emergence of cultural heritage law within the broader context of colonialism and the Eurocentric concept of “civilisation” that shaped international legal thought during this period. The article advances three central arguments. First, it contends that the notion of civilisation functioned as a foundational and largely unacknowledged catalyst in the development of domestic and international legal regimes for the protection of cultural objects. This concept, deeply embedded in colonial ideology, structured legal distinctions between societies deemed capable of safeguarding cultural heritage and those considered in need of external control or supervision. Second, the article demonstrates that states and other actors strategically deployed cultural heritage laws, and their association with civilisation, to pursue divergent political, cultural, and imperial objectives. Cultural heritage protection thus operated not only as a legal safeguard but also as a tool of power and legitimation within the international legal system. Third, the article argues that contemporary international cultural heritage law continues to reflect elements of its colonial origins, particularly in its institutional structures, normative assumptions, and approaches to ownership and protection. Current restitution debates are therefore not merely about the return of objects, but about addressing deeper structural imbalances embedded in the legal framework itself. Drawing on critical perspectives, including Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), the article concludes that meaningful restitution requires a reassessment of the historical and conceptual foundations of cultural heritage law, rather than incremental reform alone.